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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-Constitutional Law-
Federal Class Action Rule Held to Require Notice by
Plaintiff at His Own Expense to Potential Members of
the Class-Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
THE FACTS
In 1966, Morton Eisen filed an action in the Southern District of
New York against two major dealers of odd-lots (less than one hundred
shares) on the New York Stock Exchange, alleging violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act,1 and against the New York Stock Exchange,
alleging breach of statutorily defined duties under the Securities and
Exchange Act.2 This suit was filed on behalf of himself "and all other
purchasers and sellers of 'odd-lots' on the New York Stock Exchange
similarly situated": in other words, it was a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.' When defendants moved to dismiss the
class action, the district court granted the motion, holding the represen-
tative party could not adequately protect the interests of the entire class
as a single plaintiff in a class estimated in the millions. Further, the
court reasoned that the obligation of notice required under the rule4
would present financial difficulties and substantive due process prob-
lems, which obligation would not be met by the plaintiff. The court
suggested this inability and refusal to meet his obligation to the class
supported its conclusion that Eisen was more interested in himself than
in the class.5
On appeal to the Second Circuit (in a decision hereinafter referred
to as Eisen I),' the court faced the issue of whether the denial of
the maintenance of the action as a class action was a final, appealable
order. The court found authority for the defendants' position that it
was not,7 but held unequivocally that in light of the plaintiffs pro-
jected damages of seventy dollars, the effect of the denial was termi-
nation of the lawsuit, a "death knell" to the action." This article
does not take issue with that holding.
Defendants appealed Eisen I to the United States Supreme Court,
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78f(d) and 78s(a).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
5. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
6. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
7. Id. at 120 [citing Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966)].
8. Eisen I, 370 F.2d at 120-21.
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and certiorari was denied the following year.9 Eisen then appealed
the denial of the class action,10 and the court of appeals issued a sepa-
rate opinion one year after certiorari was denied (in an opinion here-
inafter referred to as Eisen II). The court, in its review, followed
the step-by-step analysis which the rule seems to suggest." The issue
on appeal was the district court's finding that the plaintiff could not
adequately represent the class. The court suggested adequacy of repre-
sentation is the standard to be used to ensure against collusive suits
and to ensure against antagonistic interests between the named plaintiff
and the remainder of the class.12 The fact that only one plaintiff ex-
pressed interest was held not to be determinative, and the court held
the "letter and spirit of the new rule" did not allow for denial of the
maintenance of the class on that basis.' 3
The court, recognizing this action as a 23(b)(3) action, 14 also rec-
ognized that the court must make a determination that the class action
device is superior to other available methods, following specific direc-
tions in the rule as to what issues will be determinative. 5 It is these
last factors that the court of appeals directed the district court to
consider before granting or denying class status. However, since the
district court had discussed the question of notice as being the most
difficult problem in the case, the court of appeals treated it rather ex-
tensively, reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff, as the representa-
tive party, must furnish notice to the class members.' 6 Further, the
court found that it was impossible on the state of the record to deter-
mine whether class members were easily ascertainable and, if so,
whether entitled to individual notice or to notice by publication.'
For this reason, the court directed the district court to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing, with emphasis on the questions of "notice, adequate
representation, effective administration of the action and any other mat-
9. 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
10. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. A class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is subject to all the require-
ments of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); (b)(3); (c)(2) and (d)(2).
12. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 562-63.
13. id. at 563.
14. Id. at 564-65. See Advisory Committee's Notes, Proposed Rules of Civil
Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-04 (1966).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides in relevant part: "The matters pertinent to
the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action."
16. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 568.
17. Id. at 569.
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ters which the District Court may consider pertinent and proper. 1 8
The court suggested, however, in dictum, that if the members of the
class were easily ascertainable and financial considerations prevented
the plaintiff from furnishing the individual notice which due process
might require, dismissal of the class might be appropriate.' 9
The district court, on remand, found in favor of maintenance of
the class action."0 On the question of notice, the court found it was
to defendants' advantage -to have the case proceed as a class action,
and so it would not be unfair to ask defendants to share the cost of
notice. But the court, in order not to arbitrarily impose this burden
on defendants, suggested a preliminary hearing on the merits to deter-
mine plaintiff's likelihood of success at the trial before determining who
would pay.2' On the question of sufficiency of notice, the court was
conscious of the public policies involved and attempted to design notice
which protected all parties "without imposing what in effect amounts
to an insuperable tariff on prosecution of the case."22  The solutions
the court accepted were individual notice to all member firms of the
New York Stock Exchange, a random sampling of the identifiable class
members, and notice by publication to the remainder of the class.23
The court of appeals (in a decision hereinafter referred to as Eisen
I1) 4 looks disfavorably on the district court decision for the reason
that the lower court held contrary to the appellate court's previous spe-
cific and unambiguous rulings.2 5  In addition, after a lengthy opinion,
the court makes what it calls a "few general observations", the tenor
of which can be deduced from the following:
18. Id. at 570.
19. id. It should be noted that a strong dissent was filed by Chief Judge Lumbard,
in which he agreed with the district judge's determination that notice to a class as large
as the one involved was impossible to meet the requirements of due process and that
the difficulties in administration were insurmountable, ending his discussion with the
admonition that, "[tihe appropriate action for this Court is to affirm the district
court and put an end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." Id.
at 570-72 (emphasis added).
20. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
21. Id. at 271.
22. Id. at 266-67.
23. Id. at 267-68. Not important for purposes of this article, but important as
dicta in the case, is the court's entertainment of the possibility of a fluid class recovery,
although no ruling on the issue is given. Id. at 264-65. The court of appeals later
disapproved of this concept, and a good discussion of what the concept involves is
contained in that later opinion. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973). This writer does not take issue with that holding.
24. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
25. It is questionable whether the court of appeals had been as explicit as it
claims to have been. See Eisen III, n. 5. The language of Eisen II, although stating
that the burden of cost is on plaintiff, also discussed the possibility of sufficiency of
notice being influenced by financial considerations, leaving an inference that these
questions were still open. 391 F.2d at 568-70.
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Class actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the
green bay tree. No matter how numerous or diverse the so-called
class may be or how impossible it may be ever to compensate
the individual members of the class, a champion steps forth ...
So far as we are aware not a single one of these class actions in-
cluding millions of indiscriminate and unidentifiable members has
ever been brought to trial and decided on the merits. But the
preliminary procedures . . . have brought such pressure on de-
fendants as to induce settlements in large amounts as the alterna-
tive to complete ruin and disaster, irrespective of the merits of
the claim.26
In Eisen II, the dissenting judge had referred to the case as a "Frank-
enstein monster posing as a class action. ' 27  The court here draws
the conclusion that the class was unmanageable in accord with the previ-
ous dissenting opinion. The court concludes that rule 23 is not satis-
factory for very large consumer actions and that this is a problem for
Congress in order to avoid what is termed "in terrorem" effects.2" Ac-
cordingly, the court enters an order reversing the decision, dismissing
the case as a class action, and vacating the findings made after the
preliminary hearing on the merits.29
But before the court dismisses the action as a class action, it makes
clear in its present holding that the previous decision in Eisen II is
to be understood as holding that in a case such as the one at bar,
notice must be given to the members of the class; that if identification
of said members can be readily made, those members deserve individ-
ual notice as a matter of due process; and that the plaintiff must pay
the costs of that notice.30
It is this latest holding which is the primary subject of this article.
Does due process in fact require notice to the members of the plaintiff
class and, if so, is the court correct when it states without qualification
that plaintiff must bear these costs? Certiorari has been granted in
this case,"1 but until it is decided, these questions remain to be ex-
plored.
DUE PROCESS-WHAT DOES IT REQUIRE?
When the Advisory Committee proposed the amended federal rule
23, with the drastic change in the binding effects of the judgment, 2
26. Eisen fI1, 479 F.2d at 1018.
27. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 572.
28. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1019.
29. Id. at 1020.
30. Id. at 1009, 1015. See also Eisen II, 391 F.2d 555 (1968).
31. 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
32. Advisory Committee's Notes, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69,
99, 105 (1966); see FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) & (c)(3).
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it faced the problem that individuals were going to be bound by judi-
cial determinations of which they might never know and which might
later prove a bar to their own actions. Foreseeing the objection that
this might be a deprivation without due process of law under the fifth
amendment,3 3 it included notice provisions within the rule, making
mandatory in a 23(b)(3) class action the "best notice practicable un-
der the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort.13  The rule allowed, too,
the exercise of a choice to "opt out" of the class with failure to exercise
this option resulting in inclusion in the judgment.3 5 For the 23(b)(1)
and (b)(2) class actions, notice is discretionary: the court "may make
appropriate orders."3
The determination by the Advisory Committee that due process re-
quired the stated notice under subdivision (c)(2) was based on two
United States Supreme Court cases and three lower court decisions.3"
A careful examination of these cases shows that they do not neces-
sarily dictate the conclusion which the Advisory Committee drew when
the class is in the position of the plaintiff, as is the case in Eisen.
The lower federal court cases are not authority for the position that
due process requires notice to the plaintiffs at the inception of the ac-
tion, for none of the cases involves that issue. Dickinson v. Burn-
ham,3 8 the earliest of the three, arose under the old federal class action
rule and involved peculiarities under that rule. Notice had in fact been
given, but at a later stage than that in Eisen. Notice had been given
after a determination on the merits. The only language in the opinion
about notice is a query on the possibility of a proposed amendment
to the rule providing more far-reaching res judicata effects, but the
court made no finding on that issue, for that was not the issue on
appeal.39
All American Airways v. Elderd4° is also not authority for the re-
quirement of notice to the plaintiff. In an action for injunctive relief,
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) & (c)(3).
36. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d) (emphasis added).
37. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952);
All American Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954); and Gart v. Cole,
263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959), cited in Advisory Committee's Notes, Proposed Rules
of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
38. 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952).
39. Id. at 979.
40. 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954).
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the court noted that in Dickinson, it had, in passing, mentioned the
possibility of extension of the scope of res judicata, but held it "ob-
vious that here in any event no such compulsive notice as [leading
text] writers visualize is possible as to the unascertained property own-
ers.' The court, however, gave neither its assent nor disapproval
to such notice requirements.
Gart v. Cole,42 an action by property owners against an urban re-
newal project, was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata because
an earlier case had been litigated as a class action by plaintiffs who
had been determined to be representatives of appellants. Notice was
not truly at issue in this case, for the court stated that appellants had
ample notice. If the case is authority for any position on the issue
of due process, it is authority only in support of Hansberry v. Lee,44
the Supreme Court case discussed hereafter.
Hansberry was appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
issue of due process and the class suit. Defendant-appellants, enjoined
by the Illinois courts from violating restrictive covenants, had been adju-
dicated to be bound by an earlier decision in a case to which they
were not parties. The Supreme Court entertained the action to "ex-
amine the course of procedure in both litigations to ascertain whether
the litigant whose rights have thus been adjudicated has been afforded
such notice and opportunity to be heard as are requisite to the due
process which the Constitution prescribes."45
The Court, after recognizing that class suits are an exception to the
general rule that individuals not parties to the action cannot be bound
by the judgment, described in dicta under what conditions the absent
members are adequately protected:
where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are
present, or where they actually participate in the conduct of the
litigation in which members of the class are present as parties...
or where for any other reason the relationship between the par-
ties present and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle
the former to stand in judgment for the latter. 46
The Court said further that as long as the latter requirement is satis-
fied, the Court would not say that "a state could not constitutionally
adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class could
stand in judgment for all, provided . . . that those present are of the
41. Id. at 249.
42. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
43. Id. at 248.
44. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id. at 43.
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same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as
to insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue."' 47 The
Supreme Court did not allow the appellants in question to be bound
by the effects of the previous decree, and the only reason was that
the representation in the previous case did not satisfy due process in
that the parties had conflicting interests."'
The Supreme Court, then, focused its attention on representation,
not notice, for a determination that due process had been violated.
The logical inference to be drawn from the case is that if the repre-
sentation had been adequate (and if the pleadings in the earlier case
had designated the defendants as a class),49 the opposite conclusion
would have been reached.
It is important to note that the Hansberry case reached the Supreme
Court through the Illinois state courts, not through the federal courts,
and so the federal rule was not in issue. Although the case arose
before the amendment of federal rule 23, if Hansberry were to be
brought today in federal court, the type of relief sought in both cases
therein would bring them within the purview of rule 23(b)(2) and
not (b)(3). The relief sought and granted in the first action was
an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from breaching
restrictive covenants. This is typically a 23(b)(2) action. 50 The
same would be true of the second action.
The Advisory Committee relied on Hansberry to devise a plan for
the 23(b)(3) class action which would satisfy the mandates of due
process. If it had correctly applied the case in view of the Court's
holding, it would have decided that due process was satisfied, under
Hansberry, in a 23(b)(2) class action when representation is ade-
quate. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that rule 23(b)(2)
does satisfy the requirements of due process, although somewhat in-
advertently. Due process, under Hansberry, would seem to be satis-
fied by the same test in a 23(b)(3) class action or, at least, there
is no indication in the opinion that the Supreme Court meant to suggest
that due process requires something more in a different type of class
action.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company5' dealt with
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 45-46.
49. Id. at 46.
50. See Advisory Committee's Notes, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 102 (1966). The lower court decisions relied on, and discussed above, would
also be brought today as 23(b) (2) class actions.
51. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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the issue of due process in a perspective unlike the one involved in
Eisen, i.e., what notice is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process to bind defendants. It will be remembered that Eisen and
his fellow class members are parties-plaintiff, unlike the parties in Mul-
lane and Hansberry. The property interest in Mullane was a common
trust fund which was the subject of a judicial accounting. A common
trust fund is one in which the assets of many small trusts are pooled
in order that the investment advantages can be greater. 52 Periodi-
cally, a judicial accounting is made which is binding on all who have
an interest in the fund.5 3
Appellant, the party objecting to the sufficiency of the notice, ap-
peared specially. That this indicates he was in the position of a de-
fendant is clear, since special appearance is a procedure whereby the
defendant appears without subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the
court in order to object to jurisdiction. Further evidence of the con-
tention that the issue was directed only to the defendant can be found
in the Court's language that the "right to be heard has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or con-
test."54 These are not options open to a plaintiff.
The issue precisely, then, was whether notice was sufficient to obtain
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in order to enter a binding
decree against him. (It should be noted that notice to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the person of the plaintiff class is not the issue in Eisen.)
The Court proceeded to the conclusion that published notice in the
case at bar was insufficient because it was not reasonably calculated
to reach those who could easily have been reached.5 5 The Court found
the failure to apprise known persons of the pendency of the settlement
of accounts deprived those persons of property rights.
The language of Mullane is reflected in rule 23, with reasonableness
being the key factor in both. 6 However, it is questionable, as sug-
gested above, that the Supreme Court intended to extend sufficiency of
notice to a party in the position of the plaintiff. A look at the cases
on which the Mullane Court relied reaffirms that position.57  In addi-
52. Id. at 307-08.
53. Id. at 309.
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id. at 319.
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) reads in pertinent part: "Mhe court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort." This language is reflective of Mullane. See 339 U.S. at 318-19.
57. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (personal service of process on de-
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tion, it is instructive to note how the Supreme Court has since relied
on Mullane.58
The conclusion that the Court has interpreted due process as appli-
cable only to the defendant is reinforced by the recent Supreme Court
decision in Boddie v. Connecticut.5 9 Boddie is a case in which the
issue of due process for the plaintiff did arise, albeit in a totally differ-
ent context. Plaintiffs, indigent residents of the State of Connecticut,
wanted a divorce but were unable to pay the court filing costs and,
therefore, were refused access to the courts. The Supreme Court held
that denial of participation in a state-imposed proceeding deprived
plaintiffs of due process.
Important for our purposes here is the Supreme Court's careful limi-
tation of the application of due process to the circumstances of mari-
tal proceedings and the Court's discussion of the principle of due proc-
ess, noting that "[s]uch litigation has, however, typically involved
rights of defendants. . . ."6 If, in fact, as the Advisory Committee
would lead us to believe, the Constitution and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of due process were intended to cover the plaintiff class,
it seems remarkable that the Supreme Court would find the variation
in Boddie worth mentioning at all.
The theory that due process does not require notice to the plaintiffs
is further buttressed by the Illinois position on the issue. Illinois has
no specific provision in its statutes delineating the requirements for
a class action. 61  Rather, guidelines have been defined by the courts,
which have limited the application of the class device to situations in
which the parties are too numerous to be joined, common interest binds
the potential class members, and the representatives adequately repre-
fendant outside of domiciliary state); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (lack of
personal service on a non-resident defendant); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)
(service by publication on a non-resident defendant); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S.
604 (1914) (service by publication on defendants who are unknown claimants);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900) (service by publication on non-resident defendant);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (service by registered mail on non-resident de-
fendant auto operator); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (service by publica-
tion on ex-resident defendant).
58. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 39 (1972) (notice not reasonably
calculated to reach defendant in forfeiture action); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,
341 U.S. 428 (1951) (notice to achieve jurisdiction over person of defendant in order
for property to escheat to state); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (notice
of adoption proceedings to non-resident father).
59. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
60. Id. at 375.
61. The only applicable statute is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1971), which is
similar in wording to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) which provides notice to the class of
proposed settlement or dismissal. The difference between the two provisions is that the
Illinois provision allows more discretion in the trial judge and allows for lack of notice
upon good cause shown.
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sent the absent members.62 Case law has not developed the require-
ment of notice in Illinois, as the courts have held due process to be
satisfied by other protections. Illinois, it should be noted, stands to
suffer severe impact from the Eisen decision, for affirmance would as-
suredly mean that the state's treatment of the issue is unconstitutional.
Illinois has faced this issue already, and the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois has decided contrary to the Second Circuit.63 Newberry Library
v. Board of Education6" involved holders of a certain type of refunding
bond issued by the school board who were dismissed on the grounds
that the same suit was pending in the courts, a suit which involved
the same defendants and plaintiffs who purportedly represented ap-
pellants in a class action. The ultimate and only question on appeal
was "whether appellants in this case are being afforded, in the [other]
case, such notice and opportunity to be heard as are requisite to due
process of law." 65  Notice is not required to class members in Illinois,
other than in case of proposed settlement or dismissal.66 Although
fourteenth amendment due process was in question, the court acknowl-
edged that since the fourteenth amendment due process clause is identi-
cal to the fifth, the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States
concerning the fifth were authority. 67
The Supreme Court of Illinois regarded Hansberry as the controlling
authority for what due process requires. Hansberry, as was noted
above, was an Illinois case, one which the Illinois Supreme Court was
undoubtedly anxious to follow. The court reasoned that the focus of
the due process inquiry is on adequacy of representation, and not on
notice.68 If the parties present adequately represent the parties who
are absent, the theory is that the represented party has had his day
in court and res judicata applies.69 The Illinois court concluded in
Newberry Library, as did the United States Supreme Court in Hans-
berry, that the representative parties did not adequately represent the
62. See, e.g., Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 111. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147
(1944); State Life Insurance Co. v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Chgo., 394 111. 301, 68
N.E.2d 525 (1946); People ex rel. Furlong v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of City of
Chicago, 404 I11. 326, 88 N.E.2d 864 (1949).
63. Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 90-91, 55 N.E.2d 147,
151 (1944).
64. 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
65. Id. at 89, 55 N.E.2d at 150.
66. See supra note 61.
67. Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. at 89, 55 N.E.2d at 150
(1944).
68. "[W]here it can be said that the procedure adopted fairly ensures the protec-
tion of the interests of the absent parties who are to be bound by such proceeding, such
does not fail of due process." Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 111. at
90, 55 N.E.2d at 151 (1944).
69. Id. at 91, 55 N.E.2d at 151.
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class, and thus the appellants were not barred from bringing their ac-
tion. The court took care to distinguish appellants' case from cases
where "the common interest, both as to the right to sue and as to
the remedy, is of such a character that a decree as to one was logically
and justly controlling or binding on all members of the class, and where
the parties could be reasonably said to stand in judgment in the place
of all others in the class."'70
This view of what due process requires, it is submitted, is all that
is required under the constitutional provision of due process, Hans-
berry, and Supreme Court interpretations of due process.
If the Second Circuit is correct that due process requires notice to
the plaintiffs in a 23(b)(3) action, then the conclusion is inescapable
that the court is correct in further holding that notice is also mandatory
in the 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) categories, even if the rule does not so
require. 71 The rule provides for the effect of res judicata of any judg-
ment entered in these actions "whether or not favorable to the class"
and "includ[ing] and describ[ing] those whom the court finds to be
members of the class." 72
In Wren v. Smith, 73 a group of prisoners moved for an injunction
against the integration of prison facilities, typically a 23(b)(2) class
action. The lower court denied relief because a previous action had
been filed and judgment had been entered as a class action. Defini-
tionally, plaintiffs in the later case were part of that class and so were
bound by the decision even though notice had not been given to all
class members. 74  Further, Snyder v. Harris"5  (most commonly
known for its holding that plaintiffs cannot aggregate their claims in
order to meet the jurisdictional amount) concluded at the district court
level that in a 23(b)(3) class action, those members who opt out are
not bound by res judicata. In dictum, the court mentioned that as
to all other class members, those who have no chance to opt out are
bound.7 6
The rationale behind the due process argument is that parties who
70. Id. at 97, 55 N.E.2d at 153.
71. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
73. 419 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 391. Accord, Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (class
members not bound by res judicata where representative party inadequately represents
them by failing to take an appropriate appeal); and Dore v. Kinnear, 71 Wash. 2d 755,
489 P.2d 898 (1971) (statute similar to (b)(2) class action-lack of notice held not
fatal because rights of plaintiffs have not been prejudiced or adversely affected).
75. 268 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mo. 1967), a!Id, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), aff'd,
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
76. Id. at 704.
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receive no notice should not later be bound by a judgment as to which
they had no opportunity to appear and protect their interests. If this
rationale is correct, then rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) and the cases
not requiring notice are incorrect. However, if unnotified parties are
deemed bound, as those cases suggest, then rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2)
surpass the requirements of due process.
A discussion such as this, although an application of legal principles,
perhaps does not really discover what due process is all about. The
words of the Constitution provide the guide: "No person shall be
• . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."77
If due process is equated with notice under these circumstances, the
issue simply becomes, what does the absent class member stand to lose
if he does not receive notice?
The most apparent answer is that he cannot appear individually on
his own behalf. The reason, of course, that a litigant would want
to appear is to protect his interest in whatever property is the subject
of the litigation. He can do so under the rule if he receives notice,
by entering an appearance through his counsel.' But if he fails to
do so because he does not receive notice, does that mean that his
interest will not be adequately protected? The federal rule provides
that the court must make a finding that "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."7  Protection
against inadequate representation or the possibility of conflicting in-
terests by the representative is provided in the same way under the
provision requiring notice and under the case law requiring none-
exclusion from the effects of res judicata. 80 From Hansberry and
Newberry Library, it is clear that adequate representation is an issue
appealable by direct method and collateral attack. Therefore, the pro-
tection thought to be needed under the notice provision-the right to
a fair hearing-is provided by the court itself, with or without notice.
Secondly, the plaintiff class in a 23(b)(3) class action typically
prays for relief in the form of a money judgment. If an absent mem-
ber does not receive notice, it follows that he will not be able to recover.
The possible recovery is the property which he stands to lose. Recov-
ery, obviously, will only occur if the plaintiff can establish liability.
If due process is to apply at all, therefore, it is logical that it should
be at that point-after liability has been determined-that the absent
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
79. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4).
80. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Newberry Library v. Board of
Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
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members should receive notice so that they can share in the recovery.
If liability cannot be established by a representative who adequately
protects the interest of the class, it seems needless to apprise the poten-
tial members of that fact, involving great expenditures in terms of time,
effort and money. Questions of cost of notice, to be discussed here-
inafter, can also be handled with more ease if the notice is deferred
until, and only sent if, liability has been established.,"
But the rule further provides that an absent class member has the
right to opt out of the class action in order to avoid the binding effects
of the judgment."2 That absent member will, without notice, lose his
right to exercise the option of self-exclusion from the class. However,
whether exercise of that option will provide the absent member the
result he seeks is questionable. Under the rule, res judicata will not
apply to him, but the doctrine of collateral estoppel might.8 3 In Guy
v. Abdulla,s4 the court recognized the problem when it alluded to the
fact that while ordinarily a person not a party to a proceeding cannot
be estopped by the judgment, class actions are an exception to that
rule.8 5  The central issue was whether an individual not a party to
litigation could be bound by the results.
Rachal v. Hill,"6 a stockholders' derivative action, faced the issue of
whether, when an identical issue has been previously litigated, the
court's finding on that issue is binding even when the parties are dif-
ferent.8 7  Appellants were those against whom estoppel was being as-
serted. The court mentioned the fact that the modem trend is to dis-
allow the relitigation of an issue once decided adversely to a litigant
even if the party asserting the estoppel was a "stranger to the prior
action."88  The court decided, however, that in the case at bar al-
lowing the estoppel to apply would effectively deprive appellants of
their right to a jury trial, and on that basis, it found in favor of the
appellants,
81. It should be noted that even if due process does not require notice at the com-
mencement of the action, the rule still does. However, it is not unreasonable to assume
that if the basis for the rule was due process and due process is later held not to re-
quire such strenuous regulations, the rule could be further amended to reflect that
view.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) & (c)(3).
83. It should be noted that under Illinois law, res judicata would apply to an absent
plaintiff, and so the question of collateral estoppel does not arise. See Newberry
Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
84. 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
85. Id. at 16.
86. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
87. "The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the district court was
correct in holding that the finding that the appellants had violated the security laws of
the United States in the S.E.C. injunction action precluded the relitigation of that issue
in the present case under the doctrine of collateral estoppeL" Id. at 61.
88. Id.
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It is important that the use of collateral estoppel in Rachal v. Hill
is what is termed by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laborator-
ies v. University of Illinois Foundation"' as "offensive" use of the doc-
trine.9 0 This offensive tactic in the context of Eisen would be utilized
if a member of the class had exercised the option of excluding himself
and, later learning of Eisen's success in the prior action, filed suit
against the named defendants and asserted they were estopped from
denying liability on the basis of the prior action.
This type of offensive use would probably be allowed under the rea-
soning of Rachal v. Hill. However, this behavior would result in
the multiplicity of suits which the rule was designed to avoid. It is
questionable whether that effect would even be desirable.91 And, un-
der the Supreme Court's ruling in Blonder-Tongue, it seems doubtful
whether the absent plaintiffs could use the judgment offensively. That
case, while suggesting that litigants who never appeared in the action
may not be estopped, refers to the offensive use of collateral estoppel.
It is important to note, too, that the assertion of collateral estoppel
there was against a defendant who was not a party to the action. The
Court mentioned its reluctance, and the reluctance of most courts, to
allow the plaintiff in a later suit to offensively use a prior judgment
of another plaintiff against the same defendant.9 2 The absent members
of a plaintiff class, even having exercised their option of exclusion,
would seem to be restrained by that language.
On the other hand, offensive use of collateral estoppel is not its only
function. The doctrine can also be used defensively. If, then, the
Eisen class were unable to establish liability, and an excluded member
of the class were to file suit against the defendants, the question arises
whether the latter might assert collateral estoppel against the former
because the issue had already been litigated. Blonder-Tongue would
seem, on its face, to suggest that the court should disallow the defend-
ants' assertion: "Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior
action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue.
. . . Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more exist-
ing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against
their position. '9 3
The question becomes, does the application of rule 23 and the exer-
cise of the right to exclude oneself operate to put a plaintiff who might
89. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
90. Id. at 330.
91. See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, § 572, at 127 (Supp. 1970).
92. 402 U.S. at 321 (1971).
93. Id. at 329.
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have been part of a class in the same position as the litigant in Blonder-
Tongue? If so, the litigant would be present neither in fact nor by
representation in the prior action. If opting out does place the poten-
tial class member in that same position, then indeed he has something
substantial to lose if he does not receive notice at the inception of
the action, for without such notice he cannot exercise his option. Yet,
to reach the conclusion cited above regarding estoppel and due process,
the Supreme Court relied on Hansberry. And yet when Hansberry
stated that litigants not present could not be bound by the judgment,
it seemed to make an exception for the class action. It is not possible
at this stage to say whether Blonder-Tongue intends to make the same
exception, since the language of the opinion was directed toward pro-
tection of a defendant, unlike the case of Eisen. Further, Blonder-
Tongue reached no definitive conclusion on the issue of due process
and offensive use of collateral estoppel, since that was not the precise
issue before the Court.94
A clear ruling by the Supreme Court on the issue of collateral estop-
pel in the context of the class action would probably prove dispositive
of whether a potential class member who does not receive notice has
been deprived of property without due process of law. But without
this clear ruling, and under Hansberry, it seems that not only is the
absent class member being afforded the due process he deserves, but
that without notice he perhaps stands in a better position than if he
were to receive notice. For if notice can be deferred until a later
time than the rule now requires in its effort to satisfy due process, 95
the class member stands to recover if recovery be had and to lose noth-
ing if recovery is not had.
Does due process require, then, that notice be sent to the absent
class members at the inception of the action? Logically, and in accord
with the postulates above, the answer seems to be in the negative, with
absent members being afforded all the protection due process dictates
under Hansberry. But if the Supreme Court affirms Eisen, the results
will be far-reaching in their impact. Illinois, as a state whose proce-
dures do not now provide for notice to the plaintiff class, will have
to re-examine its handling of the class action device; the notice re-
quirements of rule 23(c)(2) will be extended to the absent members
of the 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes; and the Supreme Court will ef-
fectively lessen the viability of the class action.
94. Id. at 330.
95. It was before suggested that notice could be deferred until a finding of liability
had been established without a violation of due process of law.
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COST OF NOTICE-WHO Is To PAY?
If due process requires notice to the absent class members at the
inception of the action, or even if it does not but the rule retains its
direction that such notice must be given, then the cost of the notice
is a critical issue. Eisen II, Eisen III and the rule require notice which
is reasonably calculated to apprise the class members of the pendency
of the action, under Mullane.9" If this is the case and, as in Eisen,
the court is faced with over two and one-half million individuals whose
identities can be ascertained, if the most reasonable method can be said
to be first class mail, then it is easy to understand that these costs
could be prohibitive.97
The problem of who is to pay this cost is an issue the courts have
faced repeatedly, for a litigant who chooses to take advantage of the
class action device often does so because his claim is too small to war-
rant individual litigation.9" Confronted with the prospect of respon-
sibility for costs as enormous as those in Eisen, the litigant would cer-
tainly tend to be discouraged from filing suit. On the other hand,
the defendant is not an unprotected party in our judicial system, and
perhaps, as Eisen III suggests, should not be subjected to these costs
without hope of reimbursement. 99
By far, the majority of courts have taken the position Eisen III sug-
gests, i.e., that the plaintiffs should, at least initially, bear the burden
of the cost of notice.' 0 Only one court thus far has placed the burden
entirely on the defendant (because the defendant was better able to
pay).' The language of Eisen III suggests that the only possible
96. As discussed in the previous section, the argument is offered that Mullane
refers to the defendant only and not the plaintiff. The same line of reasoning as
therein discussed leads to the suggestion that, contrary to the conclusion in Eisen, due
process would not require the type of notice referred to in Mullane.
97. At the present rate of ten cents for each first class letter, notice just to those
whose identity can be ascertained ranges in the area of two hundred fifty thousand
dollars. This estimate includes none of the expenses of preparation for the mailing.
Also not included are costs of less ideal notice to those who cannot be reasonably as-
certained.
98. See, e.g., Eisen II. 391 F.2d at 560 (2d Cir. 1968); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co.,
125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941); Cohen v. District of Columbia National Bank, 59
F.R.D. 84, 90 (D.D.C. 1972).
99. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1020 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. See, e.g., Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cusick v. N.V.
Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 545-46 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Buford v. Amer. Fin. Co.,
333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 180 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Tober v. Chamita, 58 F.R.D. 74, 86
(M.D. Pa. 1973).
101. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 499-500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). If defendant
has to rely on how wealthy his opponent is, this would raise serious constitutional ques-
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way plaintiff could defer this cost would be by posting a bond suffi-
cient to cover the expense so that in the event defendant prevailed,
he, if he initially paid, could be reimbursed." 2 More precisely, then,
what the court implies is that cost of notice will eventually be taxed
against the losing party.' 03 Circuit Judge Hays, in his concurring opin-
ion, agrees with the result solely because there is no hope of reimburse-
ment for the defendants if they prevail. °4
The inherent problem in not requiring plaintiff to initially pay for
notice or at least to post a security bond for reimbursement purposes
has not been articulated by many of the courts which have considered
this problem, but Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie0 5 comes closest when the court says that serious
questions of due process are raised by the practice of requiring defend-
ants to pay.106 The rationale behind this statement is very reasonable.
A defendant who, as in the Eisen situation, is required to pay several
hundred thousand dollars and prevails on the merits but cannot be
repaid has, in effect, suffered a money judgment without judgment
having been entered against him. From the point of view of a de-
fendant, this is in fact a penalty for having been sued. Our judicial
system does not provide for the imposition of such a penalty.
The same objection should be considered by those courts which have
adopted the alternative of cost-sharing, as did the district court in Ei-
sen.' O7 It should be noted that District Judge Tyler adopted the pro-
cedure of the preliminary minihearing on the merits to reach his con-
clusion that defendants should pay ninety percent of the costs." 8 This
concept of a preliminary hearing, likened to a hearing for preliminary
injunction, a concept to which the court of appeals is adamantly op-
tions. Note however, to avoid burdening either party with costs of notice, the class
was denied leave to continue as a class, with possible reinstatement if the plaintiff
prevailed, in 53 F.R.D. 664, 668-69 and 690-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
102. Eisen III, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
103. Such was the case in Partain v. First National Bank of Montgomery, 59
F.R.D. 56, 62 (M.D. Ala. 1973), wherein defendants, charged with liability, were
taxed with costs of notice as part of the general costs of the case. See also Lamb v.
United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 42 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
A possible alternative is taxing the costs of notice against the amount of recovery.
In this fashion, the result would be the plaintiff class paying for costs of notice.
However, this alternative does not solve the problem of costs in the event plaintiff
does not prevail.
104. Eisen III, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
105. 317 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
106. Id. at 1025 n.6.
107. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court
holds it is to defendants' advantage to share in costs to reap benefits of greater res
judicata and thus avoid multiplicity of suits). See also Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D.
121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
108. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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posed, 109 was not a novel suggestion. 1" 0 But a preliminary hearing
is not a final determination of the merits, and the possibility of defend-
ant's success on the merits at a later date raises the same problem
of due process. Even if defendant has only paid half the costs (to
say nothing of the ninety per cent envisioned by the district court in
Eisen), without reimbursement, he has been deprived of property not
only without due process of law, but in contravention of due process
of law. And no line can be drawn at half, or even less-for any
monies spent by the defendant raises the same problem.
On the other hand, demanding that plaintiff pay the costs of notice
has a very serious effect on the viability of the class action device.
First of all, as mentioned above, a plaintiff, even one with a meritorious
claim, is going to be reticent about bringing an action to recover a
small amount of money with the threat of expending great sums if
he fails to prove his case. As Booth v. General Dynamics Corporation
suggests,"' only a very wealthy litigant could afford to bring such
a suit. This would effectively result in a consequence opposite to what
the rule envisions: it would close the courthouse doors to the numbers
of litigants whose claims are too small to warrant individual litiga-
tion." 2  Further, it would defeat the utility of private antitrust actions
and private enforcement of federal securities laws." 3 As City of Phila-
delphia v. American Oil Company"' so succinctly stated in holding
a consumer class therein unmanageable, "It is unfortunate that many
potential recipients of treble damage awards may not be able to recover
because the Court has found their purported class to be unmanage-
able."" 5
That this result is unfortunate from a policy standpoint is an under-
statement. However, a policy consideration is not enough to override
the constitutional protection to which the defendant is entitled.
How can these two seemingly irreconcilable factors be reconciled?
Apparently, under Eisen III, they cannot be. And, if Eisen III is af-
109. Eisen III, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
110. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); cf.
Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
111. 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. 111. 1967). See generally Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
112. See supra note 96, and see generally Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264
F. Supp. 465 (N.D. 111. 1967); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968).
113. See generally Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa
1972); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Eisen II, 391 F.2d at
567 (2d Cir. 1968); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Cont'l. Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D.
555, 566 (N.D. II1. 1972); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class
Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 304 (1972).
114. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
115. Id. at 73.
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firmed, they will continue to be at odds. The cases of merit wherein
the number of potential plaintiffs is in the hundreds of thousands or
millions will probably go unremedied. This result, of course, will
block many of the largest consumer actions,"' and the corporations
employing illegal trade practices will stand without fear of court action.
The alternative is individual litigation or joinder of a sufficient number
of named plaintiffs so that they can share the cost. Joinder of so
many plaintiffs would effectively defeat the prerequisite for class action
under the rule that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable."' 1 7 The courts will then be faced with the same
difficulties that brought about promulgation of the rule.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to Eisen 111.118 If the
Court fails to find that due process requires notice to the members
of the plaintiff class, the problem of who is to pay the cost becomes
less critical than it is now. For if notice need not be given at the
inception of the action, but can be deferred until a finding of liability
has been entered,' 19 the court can then require defendant to bear the
cost without an objection of due process. In so doing, the courts can
give effect to the polices behind both the rule and the statutes involved.
CONCLUSION
As Eisen now stands, its impact on rule 23 is severe. The rule
is currently an avenue for large numbers of consumers with small mon-
etary claims to seek redress. But Eisen III effectively blocks the larg-
est consumer actions because of its determination that due process
requires notice to all members of the plaintiff class at plaintiffs ex-
pense. Notice of the type which the Second Circuit now demands
is prohibitively expensive and allows for action only by the wealthy.
Only where the class is small enough that the named plaintiff can
afford the stringent notice requirements will a potential plaintiff be
able to withstand the economic pressure this decision applies. Con-
gress, which has fashioned treble damage statutes for private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws and statutes for private enforcement of the
116. In fact, courts have begun to dismiss class actions simply because of size.
Dismissal has usually been on the grounds that the class is unmanageable, thus failing
to meet the requirements of rule 23(b)(3). One of the considerations for man-
ageability is notice-sufficiency and cost of same. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 73 (D.N.J. 1971) (six million member consumer
class); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (consumer class-all egg consumers in the United States); Gerlach v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (potential class in the millions).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)().
118. 42 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973).
119. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
282
Vol. 5: 264
Case Comments
federal securities laws, will have to refashion its statutes so that con-
sumers can take advantage of them. The alternative allows for en-
forcement only by government action and leaves large companies with-
out fear of reprisal for illegal action.
In addition, Eisen II and Eisen III extend further than the consumer
actions of the 23(b)(3) type. They extend also to the actions brought
within the purview of rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). If due process
requires notice sufficient to bind an absent party in the same manner
requisite to an in personam judgment against a defendant, then to bind
members by res judicata under any subdivision of the rule would re-
quire the same. Thus, the utility of these subdivisions will be severely
weakened. In an action for injunctive relief, where time is often press-
ing, the time expended to give notice to the class could be irreparably
damaging.
Lastly, if Eisen III is affirmed by the Court, states like Illinois
which have no statutory provision for notice in a class action will find
themselves in the same situation in which the Second Circuit finds it-
self. They will be forced to require notice. That, in turn, may have
the effect of closing the courthouse doors to large consumer actions
because of the costly procedure of notice.
The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari in Eisen, should con-
sider the constitutional issue, for it is the basis of amended rule 23
and the roadblock to redress of small grievances. These grievances,
of course, are only small when viewed from an individual standpoint.
From the standpoint of a six-million member class, they are grievances
amounting to millions of dollars on a single claim. In its decision,
the Court should take cognizance of the principles of due process and,
in so doing, find that they do not extend to a plaintiff class such as
the one in Eisen.
BEVERLEY JANIs KLEIN
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